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ABSTRACT
Among the many human tragedies Europe endured during the 20th century, the Spanish Civil 
War ranks high among the events that most strongly a+ected our collective future. France was 
deeply a+ected by this historical tragedy, since it received four successive waves of immigrants 
between 1936 and 1939. ,e episode known as the retirada [retreat] led to the exile and arrival 
in France of around a half a million individuals of all ages and all social conditions in the space of 
a few weeks.
Today the subject of the exodus, then exile, of the Spanish Republicans is well known as a result 
of the work of historians. But important questions remain. ,is chapter -rst looks at the role of 
the Franco-Spanish frontier during the Civil War, and then, against this background, investigates 
the causes of the inadequate and even humiliating reception of the Spanish refugees. It attempts 
to understand why France, known for its tradition of hospitality, was unprepared to deal with the 
emergency and, indeed, o.cially reacted with indi+erence or contempt, enforcing discriminatory 
measures against the exiled soldiers and civilian population.
De toutes les tragédies humaines que l’Europe a traversées au cours du 20e siècle, la guerre d’Espagne 
!gure hélas en bonne place parmi celles qui ont le plus fortement marqué notre destin collectif. Plus que 
tout autre pays, la France a fait l’expérience indirecte de ce drame historique en devenant la terre d’accueil 
de quatre vagues migratoires successives entre 1936 et 1939, la dernière étant de loin la plus importante 
du point de vue numérique. En e"et, la mal nommée retirada – littéralement la retraite militaire – a 
entraîné l’exil massif d’environ un demi-million d’individus de tous âges et de toutes conditions vers le 
pays voisin à travers les Pyrénées en l’espace de quelques jours, au mieux quelques semaines. Bien que 
la question de l’exode républicain espagnol, puis de l’exil soit aujourd’hui bien connue grâce au travail 
des historiens et aux publications nombreuses touchant à ce sujet (mémoires, autobiographies…), elle 
continue de poser des questions, de nous interroger, non seulement sur les causes premières qui ont occa-
sionné cet épisode douloureux, mais aussi et surtout sur le sort qui a été réservé aux centaines de milliers 
d’hommes, de femmes et d’enfants à leur arrivée sur le sol de France. Comment expliquer que la Répu-
blique $ançaise, connue dans le monde entier pour sa traditionnelle hospitalité, n’ait manifesté o%cielle-
ment qu’indi"érence ou mépris à leur égard? Comment interpréter l’impréparation des autorités civiles 
et militaires face à un déluge humain annoncé, l’improvisation des “camps sur la plage” et le traitement 
humiliant in&igé aux soldats républicains? Cette communication vise à évoquer la question $ontalière 
dans les relations $anco-espagnoles au cours de la guerre civile, à montrer combien l’exode massif de 1939 
aurait pu être anticipé et pourquoi la France a si mal accueilli les réfugiés espagnols sous la pression des 
événements pendant les années de guerre.
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Of all the human tragedies that Europe endured over the 20th century, the Spanish Civil War 
unfortunately ranks high among the events that most strongly a+ected our collective future. More 
than any other country, France was a+ected by this historical tragedy, although indirectly, since 
it received four successive waves of immigrants between 1936 and 1939, the last of which was by 
far the largest in number. In fact, the episode known as the retirada [retreat] led to the massive 
exile of around half a million individuals of all ages and all social conditions towards their French 
neighbours across the Pyrenees in the space of a few weeks.
Although today the subject of the exodus, then exile, of the Spanish Republicans is well known as a 
result of the work of historians as well as numerous publications which treat this subject (memoirs, au-
tobiographies, etc.), several questions remain about the causes that led to this painful episode in Euro-
pean history and the subsequent circumstances which surround the arrival of hundreds of thousands 
of men, women, and children on French soil. In fact, how can we explain that the Republic of France, 
known throughout the world for its tradition of hospitality, o.cially reacted with indi+erence or 
even contempt towards the refugees, enforcing without delay discriminatory measures against them? 
How can we understand the lack of preparation on the part of both civil and military authorities 
when faced with this predictable human deluge, and their improvisation of “beach camps” and the 
humiliating treatment of both Republican soldiers and civilians? ,is chapter aims, -rst, to discuss 
the role of the frontier in Franco-Spanish relations during the Civil War; second, to show to what 
extent the massive exodus of 1939 could have been anticipated; and -nally, to explain why France, 
under the pressure of events during the wartime, received the Spanish refugees so badly.
,e French population immediately perceived the Spanish Civil War as a tragedy of the high-
est order. News reports on the radio and above all in local media, especially the press, made the 
population aware of the deterioration of the political climate following the Spanish elections in 
February 1936, which were marked by the victory of the Frente popular (Popular Front). ,is was 
especially the case for the newspaper “La Dépêche” that had maintained permanent correspond-
ents on the Iberian Peninsula for a number of years, and thus the newspaper had covered events 
in Spain with particular attention since the creation of the Second Republic in April 1931. ,e 
population’s concern only grew, however, over the years, mainly because of the deepening of the 
political crisis produced by the futile military upheaval in 1932 – the famous Sanjurjada – and 
the failed revolt of the Asturias in October 19342. Two years later, the climate of scepticism in 
France with regard to the future of democracy in Spain seemed stronger than ever, despite the 
generally relaxed, calm atmosphere on the eve of the vote and daily declarations of sympathy and 
support for the Republican cause3. ,e o.cial reports issued by diplomatic representatives were 
hardly more reassuring than the news from the press correspondents, judging by the cautious re-
ports by Ambassador Jean Herbette, who was far, however, from exaggerating the situation4.
,e situation radically changed nonetheless with the military uprising on 18 July 1936. Although 
Herbette was still prudent about the possible outcome of the insurrection, because of the re-
sounding failure that had followed the previous attempt, there could be no doubt that the Span-
ish Republic found itself at a crossroads5. Contrary to the major part of the French press however, 
especially the business-owners’ press, always quick to denounce the dangers of the Frente popular 
in Spain as well as in France 6, Herbette still wanted to believe that Giral’s new government would 
be able to re-establish order and assure the normal functioning of the young democracy.
Reality proved unfortunately to be di+erent a/er the fall back of the rebel troops to the Basque 
region and Navarre and, above all, the brutal repression that rained down in the area now under 
the control of the Nationalists. Jean Herbette’s report dated 23 October shows precisely the dan-
gerous shi/ of reactions in Navarre in the -rst days of the Civil War:
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,e arrest of well-known persons who were known to belong to the organization of the UGT [Unión 
General de Trabajadores], of the CNT [Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores] and the Republican 
Le/ began in the very -rst hours. A/erwards, arrests of whole groups of people took place in cafés and 
bars. ,e prisons of the city and the villages were soon full. Numerous people 0ed. At the same time, 
searches of homes increased. ,ese arrests and home searches were carried out by Carlist and fascist 
organizations that were not acting under any authority. […] Later, rumours circulated that detailed 
documents had been discovered at the homes of certain members of extremist parties, concerning an 
imminent uprising, with lists of people in the province on the political right who were to be killed. […] 
,ese rumours coincided with the -rst victims from the combat front and the news published in the 
newspapers about the atrocities committed in Barcelona, Madrid, etc… creating an intensely emotional 
climate. From that moment, shootings began everywhere7.
For the French population observing this unleashing of violence, on one side as much as on the 
other, the reality of a full-scale Civil War soon became apparent following the o+ensive of August 
1936 in Guipúzcoa, in the Basque region. ,e bombing carried out by the Republican navy, as 
well as the bombings of Irún and San Sebastián by the rebel air force – supplied by Nazi Germany 
– led to the death of many civilians and created an outbreak of panic among the populace. As 
Hugh ,omas wrote, “the battle took place under a scorching sun and at such small distance from 
the French border that Beorlegui [commander of the Nationalist forces] had to forbid his soldiers 
to shoot towards the east” 8.
Whether it was the brutal repression authorized by General Mola in this same month of August9, 
or the terror provoked by the advance of insurgent troops and the fear of continued bombings, 
the -rst wave of the exodus towards the French border occurred in the following weeks, triggered 
by the coup d’état. Although it is di.cult to provide precise -gures, for want of detailed studies on 
this -rst population movement, we can estimate at several thousand the number of people who 
had to cross the frontier between July and September 1936. In the Bearn region, the city of Laruns 
received the -rst refugees starting on 19 July. Among them were Borderas, the Socialist deputy 
of Jaca and mayor of the same town, as well as the mayor of Canfranc, who were only able to save 
their lives thanks to their quick thinking:
,ey were working at the Town Hall when the soldiers invaded. Without wasting a second, they jumped 
into a car and 0ed as fast as they could towards the border, taking absolutely nothing with them. […] 
Soon a/er, the orders of arrest arrived, but the refugees had already arrived in French territory…10
While there were nearly 240 refugees in the convoys which made it through to the city of Pau in 
the beginning of September, it is likely that several hundred, and probably even several thousand, 
of Spanish Republicans were able to reach French territory by land from Hendaya, Irún, and San 
Sebastián, evacuated in haste by the soldiers and -ghters for the Republic, but also by sea from 
the Cantabrian provinces which would soon -nd themselves isolated territorially11. Starting in 
September, numerous groups reached the French shore, particularly through the ports of the Gi-
ronde, following the instructions of the French authorities who wanted to channel and control 
this large in0ux of population12.
,e same situation occurred on the other side of the Pyrenees, in Aragon and above all in Cata-
lonia, where several thousand people, in particular priests, nuns, and families considered to be 
on the political right, tried to -nd refuge in French territory in order to escape popular vigi-
lante mobs and the settling of the scores a/er the military uprising, as described in the newspaper 
“L’Illustration”, with a certain sadness, on 22 August:
,e Civil War is spreading in Spain with, on one side as much as the other, a similar heroism but –alas! 
– an increasing ferocity: truly, it seems as though we are returning to the barbarism of past centuries, to 
the terrible Albigensian Crusade, or the bloody fanaticism of the Wars of Religion. ,e Spanish trag-
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edy disgraces itself by its massacres of hostages, by its mass executions of conquered people. On both 
sides, it is the same excuse: retaliation13.
According to Bartolomé Bennassar, who rightly reminds us of the forgotten exodus of the ‘politi-
cal right’, there were more than 2,000 refugees in Andorra at the end of the month of August, 
while several hundred Spanish people were also able to reach the French ports of Port-Vendres, 
Marseille, or Sète by sea14. It is also necessary to note, however, that the violence perpetrated in 
the Republican areas, although equally reprehensible, was more frequently the result of isolated, 
sporadic incidents o/en linked to the failed uprisings in Barcelona and Valencia, for example. In 
addition, orders were given very quickly by the FAI (Federación Anarquista Ibérica) and the CNT 
to suppress such acts of violence as contrary to their revolutionary principles – an attitude which 
contrasts entirely with the orders given by Franco and Mola15.
In all, nearly 15,000 individuals reached France in the autumn of 1936 – many of whom were civil-
ians, of course, but above all, there were thousands of men who were of -ghting age, who hurried 
to return to Spain through Catalonia and Aragon in order to continue the -ght against the rebels16.
,is -rst exodus allowed France to realize the dimension of the con0ict that was unfolding right 
under the eyes of the military and gendarmes stationed on the border, and to put in place the legal 
and administrative framework that would later serve as a reference point for the arrival of new 
immigrants. Although Franco-Spanish relations were still governed by the old agreement of 7 
January 1862 regarding population exchanges, this text made no explicit reference to agricultural 
or industrial workers – by far the most numerous among Spanish refugees – nor to political exiles. 
However, the international commitments that France had signed required the country to accept 
foreign nationals and forbid all attempts at return or expulsion, which the -rst instructions sent 
to the préfets of French border départements on 20 July and 6 August 1936 con-rmed17. In reality, 
as Javier Rubio has stated, these -rst regulatory steps enabled the French government – from the 
very -rst weeks of the con0ict – to establish the two fundamental principles which were to guide 
policies concerning Spanish refugees in the years to come. ,e -rst principle was to assist, as much 
as possible, the return to Spain for those who wished to go back, even leaving them the freedom 
to choose the place at which they would re-cross the border. Even the possibility to live in France 
temporarily was also guaranteed by this same principle, not only for humanitarian reasons but 
also because it was supposed to take into account non-combatants, such as women, children, and 
the elderly who were external, so to speak, to the Civil War. ,e second principle, which recalled 
the precedents that had been applied since the Carlist wars, aimed to distance the refugee popula-
tion from the border zones for both political and material reasons. In fact, the presence of political 
opponents to the Spanish government at Spain’s door, whether they were the partisans of Don 
Carlos in the 19th century18, the Spanish Republicans and Anarchists until 1931, or the current 
-ghters of the Frente popular, the French authorities had to do whatever necessary to avoid the 
slightest con0ict with the Spanish groups in power, or any direct involvement in the con0ict. Yet, 
removing the refugees from the border zones also responded simply to practical considerations, 
primarily the need to distribute the burden of the Spanish exiles more equally so that the frontier 
départements did not have to bear the brunt of this new burden alone19.
A/er the failure of rebel forces to take Madrid in the winter of 1936, the military e+ort then 
turned above all to the Basque region during the following year. Cut o+ from its Republican base, 
and with its vital strategic importance due to its economic potential, northern Spain su+ered a 
wave of o+ensives in Biscay, which led to the destruction of Durango from the -rst day of the at-
tack on 31 March 1937, and above all of Guernica on 26 April, then -nally the fall of Bilbao on 
18 June, despite the fact that the Cinturón de Hierro [Iron Belt] was thought to be impregnable. 
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In the weeks that followed, tens of thousands of Spanish people, perhaps 120,000 according to 
Javier Rubio, 0ed the northern region by sea on any kind of vessel available – small boats, trawlers, 
dredging boats – -rst of all from the Basque region, then from Santander20, to reach the French 
ports of Bordeaux, Pauillac, La Rochelle, and even Lorient. As with the -rst wave in 1936, not 
enough research has been done to calculate with any certainty the actual size of this wave of refu-
gees, and the estimations vary greatly21. Two things, however, remain certain: -rst, the population 
displacement was signi-cantly greater than that of the preceding summer and second, the desire 
to -ght against the rebel troops had remained intact, despite heavy losses in0icted by the enemy 
– some 45,000 combat victims – since the end of March 1937. In the Ariège département, for 
example, where a large number of Spanish Republicans had taken refuge, nearly 85 percent of 
combatants stated that they wanted to return and -ght as quickly as possible22.
,ese events of course had consequences for France, both domestically and in its foreign relations. 
In concrete terms, the massive arrival of Spanish Republicans was hardly welcomed by a public 
opinion strongly scarred by the economic crisis and a general climate of xenophobia. ,e vaguely 
named, so-called “Spanish question” became ever more pressing as the Civil War dragged on. As 
Robert de Beauplan pointed out in the daily paper “L’Illustration”, on 17 July 1937, “It has now 
been one year since the war in Spain began, and to this day we still cannot make any predictions 
about the outcome”23. ,is assessment was equally shared by the French government led by the 
Front populaire, which was increasingly shaken up by inner power struggles, resulting in Léon 
Blum’s fall from power in June 1937 and his replacement by Camille Chautemps. ,e events in 
Spain were, incidentally, directly responsible for his fall, because the policy of non-intervention, 
which from the beginning was doomed to fail, had aroused sharp opposition from the Com-
munist Party (PCF), but also within the Socialist Party (SFIO) and the Parti radical, although 
they formed part of the majority24. For Jacques Duclos, writing in “L’Humanité”, a communist 
newspaper, on 15 January 1937, the fascist threat was real:
In its hatred of the Spanish Republic, and so great is its devotion to Hitler, the opposition does not 
hesitate to distort Mein Kampf, which declares categorically, however, that ‘bastardized and Jewi-ed 
France’ is its natural enemy which must be destroyed ‘whoever its leaders are.’ I must also state that the 
opposition has banded together with unusual allies in order to lead a campaign against Republican 
Spain, to try to make people believe that the French Communist Party wants war. ,ey have called 
‘intervention’ what in fact was our concern to respect international law; they have labelled ‘desire for 
war’ what in fact was great political insight, for the maintenance and the reinforcement of peace. […] 
Concerned with maintaining the peace, that is to say, in particular the independence of the Spanish 
Republic and the security of France, but equally worried to maintain the Front populaire, whom the 
enemies of our people want to destroy at all costs, we have said: ALL FOR REPUBLICAN SPAIN! 
ALL FOR THE FRONT POPULAIRE!25
,e ideal of solidarity towards the Spanish republicans was, however, undermined by govern-
ment measures adopted beginning in April 1937, which included reinforcing the controls on the 
Pyrenean frontier, and above all re-introducing the consular visa, which authorized the expulsion 
of anyone who did not have such a visa. In May instructions were handed down concerning the 
lodging of Spanish refugees which certainly limited the policy of welcome adopted by the Front 
populaire. While the French state continued, of course, to assert its willingness to “completely 
ful-l its obligations towards humanity”, at the same time, it expressed the will to “strictly maintain 
public order within its territories”, to forbid the free circulation of the Spanish population outside 
the départements in which they had been housed, especially movements towards border regions, 
and to refuse o.cially to -nance the housing camps26. ,is hardening of policy was not a+ected 
by the change in government, rather the contrary, since this change did not a+ect the Minister of 
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the Interior who held the position, Marx Dormoy, nor his tendencies towards restrictive policies. 
,us the “mandatory repatriation of all Spanish refugees, excepting the sick”, that is to say, not 
only men, but also women and children, was put into e+ect on 29 September 1937 without hesita-
tion. ,is policy can probably be explained by the large number of Spanish republicans settled in 
France – from 50,000-60,000 at the beginning of autumn, which represented a heavy burden for 
the French state and the towns that were ordered to accept these refugees, whether they wanted to 
or not. Blum’s government had already allocated 13 million francs for the Spanish Republicans, 
to which 55 million francs were added over the year 193727. Yet, hostile reactions to such a retreat 
from republican principles came from pro-government groups and helped so/en these radical 
measures, thanks to a new directive dated 27 November, which allowed the refugees to remain in 
France, under the condition that they either had su.cient -nancial resources or were taken in by 
third parties citizens, “with exceptions being made however, for women, children, the elderly and 
the sick who may still be housed at public expense”28.
,e growing presence of Spanish Republicans in France was of course also linked with the interna-
tional diplomatic context, in that the crossing of the French border became an essential issue in the 
discussions of the Committee for Non-Intervention29. For many months, in fact, the powers repre-
sented in this group tried in vain to neutralize the Spanish con0ict; that is, to prevent any outside in-
terference. ,e withdrawal of volunteers enrolled in international brigades particularly worried the 
French government, due to the potential risks for the escalation of violence, as a number of reports 
from Rome and Valence in March 1937 show30. Yet the need to be able to guarantee exterior neutral-
ity through a system of border controls was as indispensable as the withdrawal of foreign volunteers. 
As Charles Corbin, the French ambassador in London, tried to explain to his Spanish counterpart, 
Pablo de Azcárate: “It is only [border] control which can prevent the Italian government from con-
tinuing to send reinforcements of both men and materiel, the e+ect of which is to make the con0ict 
drag on. Once this control is in e+ect in practice”, he added, “the English government, as well as ours, 
will be ready to use all their means to resolve the problem of the volunteers”31.
,e crisis provoked by the bombing of the German cruiser Leipzig, the following 15 and 18 June, 
was in fact not far from bringing Nazi Germany into an open con0ict against the Spanish Repub-
licans and of provoking an uncontrollable escalation in the war. ,is led to the acceleration of dip-
lomatic processes which would lead, some weeks later, to the adoption of a compromise outlined 
by the British as a base for further discussion32, and then to the signing of the Nyon Agreements, 
on 14 September, which were supposed to put an end to repeated violations of international law 
in the Mediterranean33. Although this ‘Mediterranean plan’ was designed to deal with maritime 
problems, it is clear that contraband and the passage of volunteers were also occurring by overland 
routes, which led to the implementation, starting in November, of a veritable barrier plan, which, 
according to its promoter Marx Dormoy, would ensure the perfect sealing of the frontier. In the 
case of the Ariège département, directly involved in this measure, military and civil authorities 
would divide the various roles in order to guarantee the e+ectiveness of the ministerial decisions, 
with the mobilization of Republican guard patrols, infantry groups, and reserves which formed an 
interlocking net 80 kilometres wide34.
,e problem of the Spanish refugees, however, was not going to be solved during the year 1937, 
nor in the following year of 1938, despite forced or required deportations. Moreover, the attitude 
of the French authorities raises certain questions. Could it justify itself, as Bartolomé Bennas-
sar asserts, by the freedom to cross the frontier or because “the outcome of the con0ict remains 
very uncertain” (sic)?35 ,is is rather questionable, especially when reading the intentions of Marx 
Dormoy who stated in September 1937: “I have decided to order them to leave our territory”. In 
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addition, it was o/en not necessary to force them to return, since most of the men still had the 
wish to -ght, particularly the revolutionaries who were the most active and thus also the most 
undesirable for French authorities. Moreover, crossing the frontier did not prove to be easy, since 
the Republican Spanish government was strictly controlling the entry of people, a practice which 
was intended to eradicate the Nationalist ‘Fi/h column’.
Whether leaving or entering, it is now necessary to pass -ve or six barriers, with multiple checks by cus-
toms, governments, police, etc. Inside a zone of twenty kilometres from the French border, the popula-
tion has been evacuated. No one has the right to circulate without the most detailed justi-cations, and 
under threat of the most serious penalties. It is almost entirely forbidden for Spanish nationals to leave 
Spain. ,e entry into Spain of foreigners is subject to multiple investigations, and nearly prohibitive 
instructions have been given to Embassies and Consulates. At departure, one must appear before the 
Commissioner General of Ports and Borders -ve days before the proposed date of departure, and the 
only place for all of Spain where this can be done is in Barcelona 36 .
,e ‘Spanish Question’ remained thus unresolved at the beginning of 1938, not only because 
foreign volunteers could no longer leave the Republican zone, but also because it would have been 
dangerous to force them to leave as long as the Germans and Italians had no intention of doing the 
same, that is, recalling their volunteers on Spanish soil, until a/er Franco had won! More serious 
still, the o+ensive which occurred in Aragon starting in the winter of 1937 and culminating in the 
Battle of Teruel in January-February 1938, led to a third exodus towards France of nearly 7,000 
people, and included a part of the Republican Army, in particular the 43rd Division which had 
been pushed out of Bielsa by the Nationalist Army. In contradiction to the o.cial orders, which 
continued to impose barriers at the frontier, on the French side sympathizers began to organ-
ize themselves, primarily through the departmental association of the Confédération Générale du 
Travail (CGT), to come to the aid of soldiers and especially civilians from the valley of Cinca. 
Convoys were organized to send medical and food supplies into Spanish territory, but bombings 
by Franco’s Air Force ended up pushing the militias and civilian groups back into the French 
Haute-Pyrenees, especially to the towns of Arreau, Argelès-Gazost and Luz-Saint-Sauveur37. ,e 
minister of foreign a+airs, who was informed of events by Lieutenant Colonel Morel, military 
attaché assigned to Barcelona, grew increasingly worried, as did the general public opinion, with 
a great deal of discussion about the -ghting and the exodus of Spanish republicans38 towards the 
French borders. Even so, however, the deportations towards Catalonia (or sometimes towards 
Nationalist Spain) were massive, as photos taken at the train station in Luchon reveal.
It was, however, in this context – or rather, because of this context – that the government led by 
the Front populaire agreed on 17 March to re-open the border at the request of the Spanish Prime 
Minister Juan Negrín, who had come to plead the cause of Republican Spain. ,e frontier had 
been closed by Camille Chautemps a/er the departure of French socialist ministers from the gov-
ernment and the creation of a new cabinet on 19 January. ,e catastrophic consequences of this 
decision on the Republican Army’s ability to resist can be clearly seen in Aragon, once the ship-
ment of arms coming from the Soviet Union suddenly dried up39. ,is sudden reversal of policy 
by the French authorities can be wholly attributed to the return of Léon Blum at the head of the 
government on 13 March, and his desire to respond to the expansionist policy of Nazi Germany 
by an act of solidarity towards Spain. In other words, although it was too late for Austria, it was 
still possible to do something for Spain, as well as Czechoslovakia, which was also threatened40. 
Moreover, the arguments given by Juan Negrín could only have encouraged Léon Blum and the 
new minister of foreign a+airs, Joseph Paul-Boncour41, to support Republican requests:
When are the democratic nations going to understand that Spain -ghts also for them and for liberty? 
,e e+orts undertaken to organize an e+ective army with great leaders enabled victories such as that of 
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Teruel. […] In the middle of the French Empire, on the routes of the British Empire, Spain constitutes 
a decisive element in the balance of powers which are being built and destroyed today, and who will 
soon face each other in a struggle for the future of Europe and for the shape of civilization. [...] But 
this will only be possible with the help of our friends. If this assistance were refused, it would then be 
necessary to forge our victory in ‘a river of blood.’ How would it be possible that bitterness not remain? 
,e Spanish people, would they not then refuse to shed a tear during the ordeals, which will inevitably 
be imposed later on France? 42
Yet, the opening of the frontier had neither tangible nor lasting e+ects. On the one hand, this was 
because the supplying of arms to the legalist forces did not improve in the slightest, as revealed by 
the words on 24 March of the Spanish Foreign A+airs Minister, José Giral, who worried about the 
interruption of Soviet deliveries:
[…] it is undeniable that, since the beginning of the o+ensive in Aragon, that is, for more than two 
weeks, Republican Spain has not received and does not receive the massive and immediate shipments 
that we had declared were indispensable, and that we have asked for since the -rst day of this decisive 
battle. Why has the URSS not provided us with any aviation equipment for nearly a year? Why, since 
from the beginning of this terrible threat of the ongoing Italo-German o+ensive, which weighs heav-
ily upon Republican Spain, have they not appeared to want to, or to have been able to, react, and have 
furnished almost nothing?43
On the other hand, the opening of the frontier was also ine+ective because Blum’s second term 
was destined to fail from the beginning – since January, President Lebrun had stated his wish to 
put an end, once and for all, to the Front populaire44 – and Blum’s days were numbered. In fact, 
growing social pressure, political divisions, and the open hostility of the Senate with regard to the 
Léon Blum’s -nancial projects, helped to hasten his fall from power on 10 April, and opened the 
way for a second Daladier cabinet two days a/erward45.
,is new French government crisis, in addition to putting an end de-nitively to the Front popu-
laire, brought with it a sudden change of attitude towards Republican Spain with the departure 
of the socialists from the new cabinet and the shi/ of its centre of gravity towards the right46. 
,e naming of Georges Bonnet as the head of the Ministry of Foreign A+airs only con-rmed 
the legitimate worries of Barcelona in this regard, because his overt hostility for the Front popu-
laire, joined with his conviction of the weakness of France if confronted by Germany, could only 
lead him to make decisions contrary to the interests of the Spanish Republic47. For Georges Bon-
net, the French policy conducted in Spain could not be disassociated from that carried out more 
broadly in the Mediterranean, in particular towards Mussolini’s Italy, and for reasons that were 
not only ideological; in other words, he had to try everything possible to neutralize Nationalist 
Spain, to distance the Italian and German powers from the Iberian peninsula, and -nally to sepa-
rate Italy from Germany, in accordance with the policy of appeasement advocated by Lord Hali-
fax, who had just replaced Anthony Eden at the head of the British Foreign O.ce48. ,e signing 
of British-Italian Agreement on 16 April 1938, which signi-ed the legal recognition of Italy’s an-
nexation of Ethiopia and the presence of a British diplomatic agent in the nationalist area of Italy 
since the month of November 193749, could have only encouraged the radical Minister Bonnet 
to follow their example. ,e territorial separation of the Spanish Republican areas since 14 April, 
combined with the Nationalist front guard’s arrival in Vinaroz, in fact allowed him to plan quietly 
the abandonment of the Spanish Republic for a rapprochement with Franco’s Spain. As Lasmatres, 
French Consul General in San Sebastián and advisor to Bonnet in the rebel region, states:
Our interests compel us to be present at Burgos before the Nationalist Army takes Barcelona and, 
above all, before General Solchaga’s troops (who operate in the Pyrenean region) completely intercept 
the communications between France and Spain through the French-Catalan border. We do not want 
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Burgos to be able to say that the supplies in arms and ammunition to government forces through this 
route was stopped only thanks to the General and that, up until the last moment, against all our assur-
ances of our real neutrality, we were helping to supply [the Republican troops]50.
In these conditions, and also accused by London that “by authorizing the transit through its ter-
ritory of materiel coming from other countries […] [France] uselessly prolongs a cruel war with 
all its terrible consequences”51, the French government, in the persons of Daladier and Bonnet, 
decided to close the French-Spanish border on 26 May. In practical terms, the border was not 
completely sealed until 13 June, out of fear of hostile reactions from public opinion but also be-
cause it was hardly conceivable “that France [would] act alone if Italy did not take measures clearly 
establishing its good faith and its intention to de-nitively renounce its hold on Spain”52. Yet the 
harm had already been done, and, as Consul Lamastres had predicted, without exterior provisions 
of arms, the fall of the Catalan and Barcelonese front was only a question of weeks53. In making 
such a decision, the Daladier government ran another risk, that of seeing the Republican side fall 
back en masse towards its borders and thus bring about an unprecedented population displace-
ment. Already on 19 April, the French Ambassador Erik Labonne had concluded that:
If this kind of struggle unfolds at our doorstep, if the con0agration rages a few kilometres from our 
frontier, the risks that France has already incurred in the Spanish a+air will hardly be diminished, nor 
will the possible international complications. Similarly, if the -ght changes in this way, the exodus of 
people and troops, which has already happened in the Haute-Pyrenees and Ariège départements, will 
probably be reproduced in the Pyrenees-Orientales département, and on an entirely di+erent scale54.
,e préfet of the Pyrenees-Orientales département made similar statements on 23 April, when he 
spoke of “the mass exodus, which will occur towards the French border” adding that “the exodus 
will be massive” and that its extent would be “di.cult to calculate in advance”55. ,e question 
of population exodus appeared even more obvious, given the fact that nearly 25,000 people had 
already crossed the border a/er the collapse of the Aragonese front, and at least 10,000 of these 
people had remained in France. Furthermore, if we calculate the -nancial resources allocated by 
the French state since 1936, the total sum was considerable: 88 million francs. So, many factors 
should have led the French authorities to -nd alternative solutions to the reception en masse of 
Spanish refugees on French soil56.
Yet it was the predicted fall of Catalonia in December 1938, a/er the battle of the Ebro, and the 
hasty retreat of the Popular Army from Barcelona in January 1939, which would in fact create the 
conditions needed to force the French government to make a decision57. Warned by Julio Álvarez 
de Vayo, Republican minister for foreign a+airs, about the worrisome situation caused by “the 
evacuation of 150,000 people, elderly, women, and children from Barcelona”, Georges Bonnet 
proposed on 24 January, as an attempt at a solution, not to welcome this multitude, as had been 
requested through the intermediary of Marcelino Pascua58, but “to assist in the creation of a neu-
tral zone, close to the French border, and to collaborate in supplying the civilian population who 
takes refuge in this zone”59. ,is idea, however, was completely unrealistic, as Marcelino Pascua 
had to explain two days later, as an “in-depth analysis of the situation” clearly showed that the 
Republican government was “absolutely unable to fully carry out such a suggestion”60.
,e inevitable consequence that resulted was of course a massive 0ood of the population to the 
surroundings of the frontier the day a/er Barcelona’s occupation by Franco’s forces on 26 Janu-
ary. Moreover, the Republican government had already abandoned Barcelona for Figueras three 
days earlier, leaving behind a city overwhelmed by bombings and desirous of seeing the war end 
as soon as possible61. ,e crossing of Girona heading north clearly con-rmed the chaotic state of 
the situation and the breakdown of morale of the population. ,e account of Julián Zugazagoitia, 
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ex-Minister of the interior and under-secretary of state-at-war, under the orders of Juan Negrín 
since the defeat at Teruel, is, in this respect, instructive:
,e vision of Girona con-rms my pessimism. What other form than this could defeat take? ,e State, 
in its most miserable form, was scattered in the streets and in the squares. Archives, tables, chairs and, in 
the same state of abandon, ministers, under-secretaries, directors of administrations and an anonymous 
mass of bureaucrats, in groups, for whom the hasty voyage, the waiting, and the cold had thrown o+ 
any sense of composure. […] It was impossible for me to alter the agonizing sensation of an inevitable 
crushing defeat, when I was faced with a situation as chaotic as the one that I had right in front of my 
eyes. All the prestige of the government, the sole source of con-dence was, like all its administrative 
apparatus, broken, disconnected, and insubstantial62.
,e arrival at Figueras appeared even more dramatic, with the troops of refugees, and transformed 
this small town into an “immense civil and military camp which proved to be impassable not only 
for vehicles but also for people”63. However, this settlement would in any case be temporary, be-
cause the inexorable advance of Franco’s troops and the aerial bombings led to the evacuation of 
the fortress at Figueras on 4 February. In the meantime, the great exodus to the frontier and thus 
towards France had taken on immense proportions, in accordance with the estimations stated 
by Marcelino Pascua some days earlier. From 27 January thousands of people showed up at the 
frontier posts, but the orders from the French government were strictly applied and all entries into 
France remained prohibited by a double curtain composed of patrolling guards and Senegalese 
-ghters, particularly at the cities of Cerbère and Perthus. Faced with the mass of civilians which 
had gathered at the border, the Minister of the Interior, Albert Sarraut, had no other choice but 
to allow the civilians to cross, that is, “60,000 women, 13,000 children, and 2,000 men over the 
age of 55”64. In all, according to o.cial -gures, 114,000 refugees crossed over the border between 
27 and 31 January 1939, through Cerbère, Le Perthus, the pass of Ares and Bourg-Madame, and 
another 126,000 people between 2 and 4 February65.
,e large uncertainty remained, however, of what to do with the soldiers. In a report dated 30 
January Lieutenant Colonel Henri Morel discussed the size of the Republican forces, which he 
estimated at between 50,000-100,000 soldiers, and above all the risk of whether these troops 
would cross the border by force, under the e+ect of terror and the bombings by the enemy; a risk 
for which it was necessary to prepare, even to the point of either “engaging in an actual battle to 
prevent them from crossing”, or to “allow armed detachments to enter into France”66. Some days 
later, this military attaché’s point of view had changed considerably. Morel thought, and in obvi-
ous contradiction to his earlier opinion, that the problem of Republican internment was going 
to come up in the very near future, and that it would perhaps be possible to integrate part of the 
Republican army into the French forces67. ,is apparent paradox is probably a result of the strong 
negative stereotypes of Spanish Republicans, particularly in the French press, but also due to the 
fact that these same stereotypes vanished rather quickly once people met actual refugees in the 
border areas. Certainly, the Republicans remained “associated with notions of criminality, ban-
ditry, and cruelty”, even “barbarism and bestiality” in certain newspapers in January 1939 as they 
had in January 1936. However, French opinion was not unchanging, and the Spanish tragedy was 
evidently a cause that both individuals and associations rallied behind68.
,e situation deteriorated to such an extent, nonetheless, that on 5 February the surge of the 
Republican Army towards France became inevitable, and, based on the distressing report of Ál-
varez del Vayo, Georges Bonnet -nally gave the order to open the border to Spanish soldiers, not 
without having -rst negotiated the liberation of some 800 Nationalist prisoners held in Olot and 
Figueras69. It is important to note, however, that this French generosity was highly provisional, 
in the sense that rapid repatriation of Republican soldiers to the Central zone where the -ght-
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ing was supposed to continue was foreseen. Moreover, the Spanish Republican headquarters was 
quite optimistic when it “estimated the forces susceptible of crossing into France at only 60,000-
80,000”. It remained true, nevertheless, that the need to house the Republican Army could not 
have come at a worse time, since at the same time the French government envoy, Léon Bérard, had 
been there since 3 February to negotiate the naming of a French agent in the model of the British, 
that is to say a de facto recognition of the Nationalist government at Burgos70. It is understandable, 
therefore, that Jules Henry, the French ambassador at Barcelona, put strong pressure on Álvarez 
del Vayo to obtain the liberation of Nationalist prisoners, the condition sine qua non for the entry 
of Republican troops into French territory71.
In reality, the passage over the border, -rst for the civilian population, then for the military, signalled 
not the end of a tragedy, but the beginning of a new one, that of imprisonment in internment or 
concentration camps improvised by the French authorities, and this a/er humiliating operations of 
investigation and sorting, in addition to a forced march which stretched sometimes for 25 kilome-
tres or more. At the town of Argelès, then at Saint-Cyprien and at Barcarès, some kilometres south of 
Perpignan, camps were built, which were “camps” in name only 72. As Eulalio Ferrer, former captain 
of the Republican army later exiled in Mexico said, in describing the town of Argelès-sur-mer:
In terms of the camp conditions, it was really an open camp. It was a beach, a wet beach. With the East-
ern Pyrenees on one side. Month of February, frozen with a cutting wind… So, to sleep there… well… it 
was quite a feat. A feat that covered us in lice because we stuck together one next to the other to keep 
warm… so, of course this multiplied the lice and we had lice.
Sixto Úbeda, former member of the Foreign Legion, described a similar situation at the camp at 
Saint-Cyprien:
When we arrived at the camp of Saint-Cyprien, there were no lodgings to house us, and we had to 
sleep on the sand, and those among us who had a blanket, we were lucky to be able to sleep, and we put 
papers beneath us… ,ere, those who were over the age of 55 died, because they were unable to bear 
the unhappiness, the ups and downs, the storms, the cold…Each day we buried a number of them in the 
cemetery which was located facing the camp…,e Senegalese, the Algerians, and the Somalians kept 
watch over us. ,ere, they gave us one loaf of bread, 2 kilos, for 24 people, and we were each given 2 
sardines. ,e water that we drank came from artesian pumps which -ltered the seawater, and the break-
down of our stomachs was something terrible, people had to run to the shore to relieve themselves and 
we would yell: To the Beach! To the Beach! We never lost our sense of humour73.
,anks to the pressure of local politicians, prefects and the intercession of the French population, 
the situation of the 275,000 internees improved little by little in the course of the next months 
with the creation of new camps with wooden buildings in Barcarès, Vernet, Gurs, Bram, Septfonds, 
and especially with the release of the -rst prisoners. In fact, the number of the arrested Spanish 
refugees diminished to close to one-third of the original -gure in July 1939, that is, 95,000, thanks 
to the incorporation policy developed by the French administration. ,is policy had, in reality, no 
direct link with a sudden impulse of generosity or the realization of ill-treatments in0icted on the 
prisoners. It was simply the consequence of the situation created by the massive in0ux of Spanish 
refugees owing to the huge expense of their accommodation, the importance of health measures 
to be implemented, the growing call-up of civil servants and soldiers; all that in the middle of an 
economic crisis which never seemed to -nish and defensive measures in face of a war that appears 
more and more certain.
In this context, the enlistment of Republican soldiers in the foreign Legion or in the labour force 
appeared in the eyes of Prime minister Daladier to be the only resolution for the problem of the 
-nancial expenditure that at the same time would assure the replacement of the Frenchmen mo-
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bilized by military preparations74. ,e decree issued by the government on 12 April 1939 allowed 
the extension of military obligations to all foreign men from 20 to 48 years old, but this measure 
had only limited success because of its non-obligatory character. It was only with the declaration 
of war against Germany and the French mobilization that the enlistment of the Spanish volun-
teers was extended with force by civil authorities to all the refugees. As Eulalio Ferrer, a former 
o.cer of the Spanish army, relates, many ‘volunteers’ had no other choice but to join the Com-
pagnies de Travailleurs Étrangers (Companies of Foreign Workers, CTE): “Pressure to go back to 
Spain was very strong and pressure to join the Legion was very strong. ,en, we decided to enlist 
in the working companies”75.
Within a few months, thousands of prisoners would be released from the internment camps to 
be incorporated in the CTE, newly created to supply the regiments of military engineers and to 
replace the mobilized French workers in various areas of the French economy76. As a consequence 
reuni-ed families were separated anew and women too were forced to work in industrial plants 
and farms, or to work as servants or dressmakers in order to survive.
,e Spanish exile was therefore also a political one because divisions and ideological fractures, 
born during the Civil War, survived military defeat abroad and they even worsened greatly in 
France. Indeed, important personalities as Manuel Azaña, president of the Republic, and Diego 
Martínez Barrio, president of the Cortes, as well as the presidents of the autonomous Basque 
and Catalan governments, had found shelter in France from 5-6 February 1939, shortly a/er the 
collapse of the front of Catalonia and the occupation of Barcelona by nationalist troops. It was 
clear to everyone, except for Prime Minister Juan Negrín and his supporters, that the hope that 
the war in central Spain would turn into a European war had neither popular support nor made 
any sense. ,e installation of the still legitimate Republican government in Toulouse changed 
nothing with respect to the decision to continue military operations in Spain, but consequently it 
increased the internal tension between Republicans and moderate Socialists. Partisan quarrels did 
not cease with the resignation of Juan Negrín from the head of the government, on the contrary. 
Personal tensions between Republican and Socialist leaders was directly linked with the question 
of the Spanish refugees and the Republican organizations responsible for the emigration out of 
France, SERE (or Service of Evacuation of the Spanish refugees), which was tied to Juan Negrín, 
and JARE (or Junta of Aid to the Spanish Republicans) controlled by Indalecio Prieto, a strong 
-gure who was in open con0ict with the former head of government77. However, in spite of orders 
given to the Republican leaders encouraging them to leave the country as quickly as possible, not 
all could, nor wanted, to leave France.
With the military collapse of France and the rise to power of Field Marshal Pétain the situation of 
the Spanish refugees deteriorated quickly once again. If the economic incorporation of the Span-
ish Republicans had increased considerably from September 1939, thanks to the reorganization 
and intensi-cation of the CTE across the country – they were around 180 at the end of the year 
1939 – a new law adopted in October 1940 reinforced the discriminatory measures against for-
eigners and the return of a large part of the Spanish workers into internment camps. ,is law came 
close to legalising persecution, inasmuch as it provided for forced labour for the foreign workers, 
with no wages and under the strict control of military authorities. ,ose who had contributed to 
the reinforcement of the Maginot line on the French border were less lucky, because more than 
7000 Spanish workers were imprisoned by the German army and deported to Mauthausen. ,e 
majority of them died there in dreadful conditions78.
,e Groupements de Travailleurs Étrangers (Groupings of Foreign Workers, GTE) created by Vichy 
drew inspiration directly from the example of CTE organized by the ,ird Republic and consti-
The Devil in France 313
Tolerance and Discrimination: Minorities, Exiles and Migration 
tute therefore an example of continuity between the two regimes. Nevertheless, the harshness of 
the treatment of these – mostly Spanish – prisoners and the military discipline imposed on them, 
re0ected the aversion of the French State for these ‘Reds’, who were considered responsible for the 
civil war and misfortunes of Spain. In the autumn of 1940, a/er their failure in the battle of England, 
the Germans also learned to exploit this skilled and cheap workforce, and questioned the Vichy gov-
ernment’s authority over this human resource. Soon the Spanish Republicans were requisitioned by 
force by the thousands in the service of the Todt Organization in La Rochelle, Royan, Lorient, Brest 
or Bordeaux, to work on the construction of the Atlantic Wall or the V1 and V2 launching sites up 
to the liberation of France in summer 1944. As Guillermo Ródriguez relates:
So, when there were enough people [“volunteers”] they formed a train and sent us some to La Rochelle, 
others farther to the submarine naval bases, which were the most important, the -rst they began con-
structing before the Atlantic Wall. On our arrival there were dogs, shouting, whiplashes. ,ey took us 
to a camp that had served for the Vietnamese who worked in a gunpowder plant. We started at 5 am 
and stayed on the construction site till 7 pm, and sometimes we would come back to the camp only at 
midnight79.
Long before the Allied landings of June 1944, and even that of November 1942 in North Africa, 
the GTEs were the core of the armed resistance, which would give birth to the maquis and con-
tribute actively to the liberation of France. ,e -rst Spanish groups were created in the autumn of 
1940 in Haute-Savoie, Haute-Vienne, Brittany and also in the Pyrenees. ,e sabotage of indus-
trial plants and technical installations began in 1941, in connection with the French resistance 
movements and Anglo-American agents. In total, more than 21,000 Spaniards participated in 
the -ght against German and Vichy military forces in France, and about 15,000 served in the 
Free French Forces (FFL) abroad. Many of them were imprisoned during the war, sentenced to 
death or deported to Germany and Spain, where Franco took a personal interest in judging and 
executing prominent Republican politicians: Lluis Companys, the former president of the Cata-
lan government, was stopped by the Germans from falling in the hands of Franco, sentenced to 
death on 15 October 1940 and executed shortly a/er. Ironically Manuel Azaña was able to avoid 
Franco’s executioners by dying in Montauban on 3 November 1940, a few days before he was to 
be delivered to the Spanish dictator by the Vichy government80.
,e collapse of the Vichy government in 1944 and subsequent restoration of democracy in France 
were seen by the Republican exiles as the preliminary stage for the liberation of Spain. ,e exiles 
that fought in the bands of Spanish guerrillas tried to invade Spain through the Val d’Aran in 
1944-1945, unsuccessfully, but the hope that the allied powers, particularly France, which owed 
them so much, would support them in their struggle against fascism allowed them to keep their 
-ghting spirit alive, until the new reality of the Cold War extinguished their illusions.
Even though eventually an estimated 340,000 of the 465,000 Spanish refugees, one way or an-
other, were able to return to Spain by the eve of the military collapse of France in May 1940, it is 
important to evaluate the action of the French authorities towards the Spanish Republicans from 
1936 on, whatever the numbers involved, with regard particularly to the policies of reception. It 
is obvious that the situation changed considerably during the Civil War. What appeared at the 
beginning of the war as a limited and controllable phenomenon, due to the massive return of 
refugees to the combat zones, had been transformed in 1939 into an event of an unprecedented 
scale. ,e main question, however, is whether or not this was a foreseeable fact. As we have shown, 
the warning signs were numerous and repeated, particularly a/er the fall of the Aragonese front 
in the spring of 1938. It is hardly possible to speak of an unexpected exodus, even though the 
actual numbers involved in the end far surpassed the o.cial estimates – both the Spanish and 
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the French. While Bartolomé Bennassar is of course right that “the -rst waves of refugees, while 
of considerable size, were well received in 1937”, it is highly dubious to argue that “the Spanish 
themselves in no way expected such a sudden fall”, without even mentioning the responsibility at-
tributed to Negrín’s government in this disaster81. One would have had to have been either naïve 
or blind not to see – since the lieutenant colonel stated it repeatedly, as did Ambassador Jules 
Henry – that the Republican army’s resistance was weakening and that a general collapse was 
highly likely. How can we explain, moreover, that the authorities did not plan the construction of 
housing camps, at least partially, following the example of the town Rieucros in the Lozère dépar-
tement, created by government decree of 21 January 1939? In fact, the answer lies not in any sup-
posed ‘e+ect of surprise’, but rather in the conscious refusal to accept the possibility of a massive 
arrival of refugees. How could it have been otherwise, when the opening of the camp at Rieucros 
already provoked such sharp hostility in public opinion?82 In fact, the Daladier government had 
no desire to provide grist for the mill to a very active extreme right-wing movement, or to further 
agitate public opinion, which had anticipated the massive arrival of foreigners in France since the 
beginning of the economic crisis and was increasingly xenophobic83.
Nevertheless, the impossibility of preventing the human avalanche in January - February 1939 
forced the government to take exceptional measures, o.cially to open ‘concentration camps’ – ac-
cording to the o.cial terminology – where hundreds of thousands of Spanish Republicans suf-
fered from lack of food and water, cold, diseases, ill-treatment and, in some cases, died. It was only 
with the mobilization and severe lack of workers that a large majority of them were able to leave 
the camps between April 1939 and June 1940, o/en uniting families which had been dispersed. 
,ey would nevertheless continue to be closely watched by the police owing to the ‘threat’ the 
posed as Spanish ‘Reds’. ,eir darkest hour occurred in June 1940 with the collapse of the French 
army and the destruction of democracy under Marshall Pétain. Soon a/er, the Spanish refugees 
were arrested again, put into internment camps or deported. ,e ‘luckiest’ of them were incor-
porated into the GTE or hired by private farmers or factory owners to work for the national 
economy. ,e ‘politically dangerous elements’ su+ered harsh treatment or were handed over to 
the Germans; the others tried to survive as they could, with the support of French civilians and 
priests, who realized how unjustly they were treated.
In a certain respect, it is possible to trace a link between the French republican policy and the 
actions taken by Vichy France, as Spanish refugees were considered from the beginning to be 
‘unwelcome’ elements, discriminated against as potentially dangerous by a large part of the popu-
lation and forced to work for the bene-t of the national economy. However, the Vichy regime 
considered Spanish ‘Reds’ as enemies of the State and treated them as such, condemning many of 
them to heartless if not cruel living conditions for those who resisted oppression. ,eir signi-cant 
and vital participation in the Liberation of France was the result of such hatred and misbehaviour, 
as well as a chance to prove that the democratic spirit had not disappeared, nor had their will to 
-ght against fascism, French and Spanish, on both sides of the Pyrenees. Paradoxically, the Span-
ish Republicans were quick to forgive France for the discriminatory policy that they su+ered along 
with Austrian, German and Italian Anti-Nazis from 1939 to 1945 for they recognized in the end 
that the ideal of freedom, which once characterized France, still existed and that their future was 
bound to the now restored French republic under the aegis of General de Gaulle.
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